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This dissertation develops a macroeconomic model of state borrowing costs for the U.S.
monetary union that is founded on the real business cycle theory. The model develops
supply and demand side equations for the U.S. monetary union. It shows that the spread
between the borrowing cost of a state and the risk free rate is function of default probability
(PD) of the state government and loss given default (LGD) for investors. In this macroe-
conomic model framework, the probability of default is determined simultaneously by the
intertemporal utility maximization behaviors of investors (consumers) and the ability of a
state government to maintain its budget constraints. This model also empirically identifies
exogenous shocks that influence the default probability and the borrowings cost of a state
in the U.S. monetary union. After analyzing 17,400 newly issued general obligation bonds
and controlling for the variation in bond characteristics, empirical analysis shows that
exogenous shocks emerge from state fiscal institutions, political institutions, government
budgetary decisions, public debt stock, pension funding, and labor market conditions; all
these variables impact the yield spread between a state borrowings cost and the risk free
rate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
For a long time now, researchers have been reporting on the unsustainable level of states′
public pension funding, while tax bases are stagnant and expenditures are ballooning for
state health care and welfare programs. During the past decades, state governments have
grown by providing public goods, such as police protection, education, highway building and
maintenance, welfare programs, hospitals, and health care, etc. However, revenue for state
governments, which comes mostly from taxation and fees, cannot keep pace with increased
spending; thus most states have been issuing municipal bonds to meet budget deficits. In
2013, local and state government borrowed $334.9 billion and the total municipal debt rose
to $3.67 trillion. Thirty-nine percent of this substantial debt is owed by state governments,
the rest is owed by local governments. The size of the municipal bond markets has increased
to three trillions dollars since the year 2010, and for the first time since the Great Depression,
both investors and regulators are concerned that several U.S. states might go bankrupt
and/or need massive taxpayer funded bail outs (Nadler & Hong, 2010). Public anxieties
about the state governments′ debt have reached a peak, and investors and tax payers alike
are worried about the capacity of municipal governments to service the existing debts, as
well as the likelihood of future tax hikes. Investors′ concern about the ballooning state debt
and the worsening of states′ fiscal situations may very soon be reflected in the municipal
bond markets, where an increasing yield for all types of bonds across the states is becoming
more and more probable. In the present municipal bond market, a jump of a couple of
percentage points in municipal bond yields would transfer a large sum of money from tax
payers to investors. This study aims to shed light on the determinants of state government
borrowing costs, i.e., the yields of municipal bonds.
At present, a number of studies provide theoretical arguments and empirical supports
for the predominant factors that influence the borrowing costs for states. In general,
most of this research can be grouped into two categories: (1) research that emphasizes
the general economic variables, influencing states and (2) research that highlights state
2fiscal institutions that govern budget rules. Economic variables, which can have a direct
or indirect impact on states′ revenue and expenditure, i.e., the capacity to service debts,
significantly influence municipal bond yields. Since the population characteristics, industrial
base, natural resources, property values, etc. of states vary, the capacity to service debt also
varies from state to state, as does the borrowing cost. Liu and Thakor (1984), Goldstein
and Woglom (1991), and Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) estimate the impact of
state-specific economic variables on the yields of state municipal bonds after controlling for
the credit ratings of states. They identify state economic variables, such as net debt, debt
per capita, state tax rate on interest income from municipal bonds, unemployment, and
median home value that varies in municipal borrowing costs. One particularly important
argument emerges from the research: the market disciplines those states that run excess
fiscal deficit and accumulate debt by demanding higher borrowing costs. This market
disciplinary behavior may provide incentives to state governments to correct their fiscal
behavior.
The literature also emphasizes the impact of fiscal institutions on borrowing costs,
arguing that although every state operates in a similar legal and fiscal environment, the
fiscal behaviors and budgeting rules differ substantially from state to state. The difference
can be attributed to substantial variation in states′ fiscal institutions. These institutions
include, but are not limited to, the constitutional and legislative requirements for balanced
budgets, tax and expenditure limits, limits on issuing general obligation debt, etc. These
antideficit fiscal institutions can have two effects. First, these institutions can reduce the
primary deficit by limiting incentives for fiscal policymakers for spending more than the
tax revenue and increasing government size by extracting more and more revenue from the
public. Second, these fiscal institutions also reduce borrowing costs for states because the
bond market demands a lower default risk premium for states with better fiscal management
(Poterba & Rueben, 1999). A large body of literature substantiates the effect of fiscal
institutions on government size and fiscal deficit, as well as the amount of states′ borrowing
and their borrowing cost. Bohn and Inman (1996), Poterba (1994), and Primo (2003) report
that states with strict balanced budget rules also have lower per capita spending and lower
budget deficits than those states that do not. Ruben (1996) reports that states with tax
and expenditure limits, also have lower spending, equivalent to a fraction of state income.
Markets often price these antideficit fiscal institutions by lowering the borrowing costs of
the states that support them. Goldstein and Woglom (1991), Bayoumi, Goldstein, and
Woglom (1995), and Poterba and Rueben (1999) report a significant negative relationship
3between the antideficit fiscal institutions and states′ borrowing costs. A shortcoming of
their studies is that they do not analyze market transaction data of states′ borrowing
costs. They use survey data collected by Chubb Corporation on dealers′ expected yields
for general obligation (GO) bonds. Craig and Kenneth (2005) overcome this shortcoming
by estimating the relationship between antideficit fiscal institutions, such as debt limit,
balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, credit ratings, and the states′
borrowing costs, and analyzing market data of general obligation bond yields. They find
debt limit, balanced budget requirements, and expenditure limits have a significant impacts
on states′ credit ratings, but do not have any impact on the states′ borrowing costs. Only
tax (revenue) limits significantly impact the borrowing costs for the states.
The analysis conducted in this paper differs from prior studies in several important ways.
First, this study develops a macroeconomic model that determines the borrowing costs of
U.S. states inside a monetary union. Second, it analyzes a larger data base, specifically
17,400 new issues of general obligation (GO) bonds that were offered to the market by 37
states between the years 2001 and 2011. The yields of these GO bonds reflect a wider
market perception of the default risk to the states. Third, this study examines a larger set
of economic, political institutions and fiscal institutions variables, after controlling for bond
characteristics that are found to influence the probability of default of a borrower state and,
therefore, increase the borrowing cost.
The macroeconomic model of state borrowing costs in this study is founded on the
real business cycle theory and developed supply and demand side equations for the U.S.
monetary union. This model shows that spread between the borrowing cost of a state and
the risk-free rate is a function of default probability (PD) of the state government and loss
given default (LGD) for investors. In this macroeconomic model framework, the probability
of default is determined simultaneously by the intertemporal utility maximization behaviors
of investors (consumers) and the ability of a state government to maintain its budget
constraints. This model identifies economywide exogenous shocks that disturb the dynamic
equilibrium through endogenous transmission mechanisms, and influence the debt servicing
capacity (the default probability) of a state. Since these shocks create nondiversifiable risks
at the portfolio level, investors price these shocks, and the borrowing costs of U.S. states
changes. After analyzing 17,400 newly issued general obligation bonds and controlling for
variation in bond characteristics, the empirical work estimates that exogenous shocks that
emerge from state fiscal institutions, political institutions, government budgetary decisions,
public debt stock, pension funding, and business cycles have significant statistical power to
4explain the yield spread between a state borrowing cost and its risk-free interest rate.
Major implications of findings of this study are: states in U.S. monetary union can
lower their borrowing costs if they institute antideficit fiscal rules, and they are governed
by fiscally responsible political parties. The municipal bond market disciplines those states
that are fiscally profligate and accumulate debt, with higher borrowing costs. Exogenous
macroeconomic shocks are nondiversifiable in a portfolio level and the municipal bond
market compensates investors for accepting these risks in their portfolios.
Organization of this Ph.D dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the municipal
bond market and summarizes the existing literature, Chapter 3 develops the macroeconomic
model of state borrowing costs under U.S. monetary union, Chapter 4 and 5 estimate the
model empirically and explain the results.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A municipal bond or security is a promise by a local or state government or state agency
to repay lenders the principal amount of borrowed money as well as any interest accrued
after a fixed period. The maturities of municipal bonds vary from 1 to 30 years, but some
have maturities lasting up to 40 and even 100 years. Municipal securities with maturities of
more than 13 months are generally referred to as municipal bonds, and those with maturities
of less than 13 month are called anticipation notes or commercial paper.
Both long- and short-term municipal securities are categorized into two major groups:
general obligation (GO) and revenue bonds. GO bonds are pledged by the full faith and
credit of a local or state government, which implies that all available local and state
governments resources (except any revenue already dedicated to other purposes) will be
used to pay the debtor both principal and interest. Revenue bonds are issued by a local or
state government to finance diverse capital development projects and are generally backed by
income from those particular projects. Sometimes, a revenue bond issued to finance specific
capital projects is also backed by an unlimited general obligation pledge. This type of bond
is called a double-barreled Bond. Outside these two types of municipal bonds, there are
also specific tax bonds and moral obligation bonds (The Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds,
6th edition).
Interest income from most of the municipal bonds is exempted from federal taxation.
On some occasions, interest income from the municipal bonds is also local and state tax
exempt. Thus, these bonds are called tax exempt bonds. There are some municipal bonds,
created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment ACT of 2009, that are taxable and
are subsidized by the federal government. These bonds are subject to federal, state, and
local government taxes. They are called taxable municipal bonds. One example of this type
of bond is the Build America bond (The Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds, 6th edition).
Due to their tax exempt status, municipal bonds are an attractive investment option for
high net worth individuals and institutions with higher marginal income tax rates. Among
6the institutional investors, commercial banks, fire, and causality and life insurance compa-
nies are deemed worthy of such status (Rosenbloom, 1976). Since insurance companies are
minor participants in the municipal bond market, the commercial banks are the principal
institutional investors and generate the bulk of the demand for municipal bonds (Kimbal,
1977). Commercial banks not only use municipal bonds′ tax exempt status as a shield
against higher marginal tax rate, but also invest in municipal bonds, particularly in short-
to intermediate-term bonds, as part of their liquidity management strategy (Rosenbloom,
1976).
New issues of municipal securities are first sold in the primary market. Issuers sell new
issues either by negotiated or by competitive bid methods. In a negotiated sale, an issuer
finds an underwriter to manage the sales. The underwriter can be a single dealer or a group
of dealers. Both the issuer and the underwriter negotiate the terms of offering, such as price,
maturity, insurance, etc. In a competitive sale, an issuer invites sealed bids from competing
underwriters, and the issuer chooses the underwriter who offers the most favorable terms.
The terms of offering, such as price, maturity, etc. are proposed by competing underwriters.
Underwriters who buy new issues from issuers in primary market usually do not hold
these securities until maturity, sell them to investors in the secondary market. After that,
investors regularly buy and sell municipal securities among themselves in the secondary
market. In the secondary market, trading of municipal securities does not take place in
an organized exchange. It takes place in an over-the-counter market that is dominated by
dealers.
2.1 Existing Municipal Bond Pricing Models
When an investor earns interest income from a municipal bond issued by a local or state
government, this income is exempted from federal, and, on some occasions, state income
taxes. For a progressive tax structure, the value of the tax-exemption feature increases as
investors′ taxable income qualifies them for a higher-income tax group. Merton H. Miller
(1976) first argued that two bonds with similar maturities and credit ratings are identical
except for the fact that one is taxable by the federal government and the other is federally
tax exempt; thus, an investor will not distinguish between the two if the yield on the
tax-exempt bond (RM ) is equal to the after-tax yield on the taxable bond (RT ):
RM (n) = (1− t)RT (n) (2.1)
7‘t’ is the federal tax rate on taxable bond income in equation (2.1). In equilibrium,‘t’ is
determined by the income tax rate of the marginal buyer of a tax-exempt municipal bond.
There are two contrasting theories regarding what determines the income tax rate of the
marginal buyer of a tax-exempt municipal bond.
Merton H. Miller (1976) suggests that the tax rate of the marginal bond holder would be
equal to the corporate tax rates. He argues that the supply of taxable bonds is responsive
to the relative yields on taxable (corporate) and tax-exempt (municipal) bonds. If the
corporate income tax rate is higher than personal marginal income tax on interest income
from the taxable corporate bond, then corporations can gain from leverage by supplying
taxable corporate bonds. If, however, the corporate income tax rate is lower than personal
marginal income tax on interest income from the taxable corporate bond, corporations
lose from leverage. Miller (1976) reasons that since personal income tax is progressive but
corporate income tax is flat, then firms supply taxable corporate debt to the point where
the tax advantage from leverage is exhausted, and in equilibrium corporate income tax
rate is equal to the personal marginal income tax rate of taxable corporate bond buyers.
Thus, in equilibrium, the spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds of similar risks
should be equal to the corporate tax rate. Fama (1977) further argues that corporations
can reap arbitrage profit if the spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds is more than
the corporate tax rate. They can do so by purchasing tax-exempt bonds and issuing debt
with tax deductible interest income, using tax-exempt bonds as collateral to hold the risk
constant. Banks, in particular, can be engaged in this arbitrage activity since they are
allowed to both purchase municipal bonds and issue taxable debt for business purposes
(Heaton, 1986).
The contrasting theory argues that the equilibrium marginal tax rate is determined
by the supply of tax-exempt bonds from local and state governments, and the demand
of institutional investors, mainly commercial banks, property insurance companies, and
individual investors. The supply of municipal bonds is primarily determined by the financial
need of state and local governments to undertake capital investments or to balance their
budgets, inelastic to municipal bond yield. So, equilibrium marginal income tax rate
of municipal bond investors depends on the demand of the institutional investors and
individual investors (Hendershott & Kotch, 1977; Kimbal, 1977). Since property insurance
companies are minor participants in the municipal bond market, the demand for municipal
bonds mainly depends on the participation of commercial banks (Fortune, 1973; Kimbal,
1977). Now, the demand for municipal bonds from commercial banks largely depends on
8the level of their income, i.e., the amounts of income commercial banks need to shield
from taxation. When the income of commercial banks is higher, the demand for municipal
bonds is also higher. Thus, yields on municipal bonds fall and the marginal tax rises.
On the other hand, when the income of commercial banks falls, the demand for municipal
bonds by institutional investors also falls. Thus, municipal bonds must offer higher yields to
attract investors from the lower income tax group, and the marginal tax rate falls (Trzcinka,
1982). According to this theory, the Miller (1976) hypothesis is true as a special case: the
income tax rate of marginal investors is equal to the corporate tax rate only if all municipal
bonds are purchased by institutional investors such as banks, quite a rare situation. Thus,
the income tax rate of marginal buyers of municipal bonds varies according to the level of
commercial banks′ participation (Trzcinka, 1982).
Trzcinka (1982) examines these two contrasting theories and concludes that if risk is
properly accounted for, then the marginal tax rate is equivalent to the corporate tax rate.
He argues that Miller′s (1976) hypothesis apparently does not hold because tax-exempt
(municipals bonds) bonds are riskier than taxable bonds (corporate bonds) of the same
credit ratings. When credit rating agencies calculate ratings, they focus only on default risk,
ignoring other risk factors. Higher cost of acquiring information, higher cost of collateral
seizure, and politically motivated behavior of state officials may make municipal bonds
riskier than corporate bonds with the same rating and maturity. To incorporate all these
risks, Trzcinaka proposes a random intercept model, a time varying intercept that estimates
risk premium and reports that the coefficient of treasury bond yields was not significantly
different from the corporate tax rate; this findings support Miller′s hypothesis. Furthermore,
the time varying intercept is larger for longer maturities and for lower bond ratings. Fortune
(1988) conducts a study aiming to reexamine Trzcinka′s (1982) study and shows that results
reported by him are valid when personal income tax has lower variation. He recalculates
Trzcinka′s model for the period 1976 to 1985, when the personal income tax rate showed
large volatility, and finds that results vary substantially from those reported by Trzcinka.
Subsequent research explores additional factors, other than the income tax rate of marginal
investors, that influence the relative yields of taxable and tax-exempt bonds with similar
credit ratings. These studies extend equation (2.1) in order to incorporate risk premium
for additional risk factors associated with municipal bonds, and tax effect. A tax-exempt
(municipal) bond pricing model can be written as:
RM (n) = (1− t)RT (n) + λ(n) (2.2)
The term ‘λ’ represents the risk premium as a compensation for the greater risks associated
9with municipal bonds compared to taxable bonds of the same maturities and credit ratings.
Rosenbloom (1976) suggests that the call protection of municipal bonds can be a major
risk factor, since it provides the issuer a right to buy back the existing bond for a pre-
determined price when the present market interest rate is lower than the interest rate the
bond offers. Thus, a call protected bond offers a risk premium over a non-call protected
bond. Kidwell and Koch (1982) report that a yield differential exists between a general
obligation municipal bond and a revenue municipal bond, and this yield differential is
sensitive to the business cycle. They argue that revenue bonds are riskier than general
obligation bonds because income from projects that guarantee servicing of these revenue
bonds, varies along with the fluctuations in general economic conditions. In addition,
banks prefer high quality general obligation bonds, since they meet regulatory requirements,
are standard in nature, and fulfill banks′ commitment to local communities. In contrast,
municipalities prefer to issue revenue bonds rather than general obligation bonds since
municipalities have statutory restrictions and/or need voter approval in order to issue
general obligation bonds. Thus, the municipal bond market is segmented between general
obligation and revenue bonds, which causes a yield differential between these two kinds
of bonds. Kidwell and Koch (1983) further show that the municipal bond market is
segmented based on maturity. Investors do not consider two municipal bonds with identical
default risks a perfect substitute for each other if one bond has a short-term maturity
and the other has a long-term maturity. The supply side argument is that municipal
governments often need constitutional amendments or public referendums to issue long-term
bonds. Thus, they issue short-term bonds more often than long-term bonds in order
to finance current operations. Their demand side argument is that commercial banks
prefer short-term municipal bonds over long-term bonds because most banks′ liabilities are
short-term in nature; as a consequence, short-term municipal bonds meet banks′ liquidity
needs. Therefore, short-term municipal bonds offer lower yields than long-term municipal
bond with similar default risks. Wang, Wu, and Zhang (2007) report that a liquidity risk
premium constitutes a significant portion of municipal bond yields. Investors receive higher
yields for bonds with returns that are more sensitive to market liquidity. Their study
estimates that after controlling the effects of credit rating and maturity on yields, liquidity
premium is higher for municipal bonds with a larger size and greater trading frequency.
Poterba and Rueben (1999) comprehensively estimate the impact of fiscal institutions
on states′ borrowing costs using a model similar to equation (2.2). They argue that the
budget rules and fiscal policies of states differ substantially in their fiscal institutions. Fiscal
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rules and policies, which are antideficit, reduce the borrowing costs for states as investors
demand lower risk premiums for potential defaults. Poterba and Rueben (1999) estimate
that balanced budget requirements, expenditure limit, and revenue limit have statistically
significant impacts on borrowing costs. States with more stringent balanced budget rules,
and/or constitutional limits on expenditure and revenue, have lower borrower costs in the
municipal bond market.
Goldstein and Woglom (1991) estimated another municipal bond pricing model based on
the capital theory of the determinants of expected return for assets in a diversified portfolio.
In their model, they show that the spread between return from the municipal bond and
the return from risk-free asset (U.S.treasury) depends on the probability of default for the
municipal bond. The higher the default probability, the larger the spread will be.
RM −RT = (1 +RT )(1− pi)/pi (2.3)
In equation (2.3), ‘pi’ is the probability of default. Using Chubb insurance survey data,
Goldstein and Wolgom estimate this model by considering the current debt and the size of
the current budget deficit of a state, the trend growth in debt, and the constitutional limit
of borrowing of a state as determinants of the probability of default. All these variables
were found to have statistically significant explanatory power for probability of default.
Using Goldstein and Woglom′s (1991) model, Johnson and Kriz (2005) later estimated
the impacts of fiscal institutions, debt limit, balanced budget rules, and tax and expenditure
limits on default risks, credit ratings, and the borrowing costs of states. They report that
expenditure limit, debt limit, and balanced budget rules have a statistically significant
impacts on credit ratings, but do not have any impact on borrowing costs. Only revenue
limit has a significant influence in the municipal bond market.
In the next chapter, a macroeconomic model of state borrowing costs is developed. This
model is founded on principles of the real business cycle for states inside the U.S. monetary
union. This model is more comprehensive than previous models because it develops both
supply and demand side equations for a state economy, showing that the yield of municipal
bonds is determined by interactions among different rational agents.
CHAPTER 3
A MACROECONOMIC MODEL FOR
MUNICIPAL BOND PRICING
This study considers a monetary union with two states. Each state uses a common
currency, and the monetary union has an independent central bank and a federal govern-
ment. The central bank has the power to issue legal tender (common currency) for all
states but does not distribute any seigniorage revenue to any member state. Moreover,
the central bank does not finance the budget deficits of any state by purchasing its debts.
This independent central bank has a constitutional responsibility to maintain price stability
only, and not to inflate away member states′ debts or accumulate their debts to finance their
budget deficits. Each member state of the union has its own government with the authority
to manage and finance its own budget, and if there is a budget deficit, to collect taxes from
factors′ income and to borrow from the financial market using the common currency. The
federal government can provide budgetary supports to a state by intergovernmental transfer,
which could be a substantial amount if any state defaults in its debt servicing. This chapter
also assumes that the federal government has no constitutionally binding responsibility to
bail out a state in case of default.
3.1 Supply of Goods and Services
Each state has an economy that produces goods and services utilizing three factors, based
on Cobb-Douglas production function: capital (K), labor (L) and land (W). However, the
production function is subject to random exogenous productivity shocks. Output or goods






i,t ; (i=1,2 & t=1,2....n) (3.1)
The random productivity shocks, zt follow the AR(1) process and zt = ρzt−1 + t, where t
is a white noise process. The production function has properties of constant return to scale
and a diminishing marginal product of factors. According to this production function, the
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goods and services produced by each state depend only on its stock of capital, labor, and
land.
For each state, the demand for capital, labor, and land comes from profit maximizing
and perfectly competitive firms that are price takers in both output and input markets.
Each firm hires factors until the marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. In the absence
of any market imperfection, such as involuntary unemployment, wage stickiness, and trade
union power, factor markets clear when the marginal product of each factor is equal to the
real factor price.





with respect to Lt,Kt and Wt. Thus, for i
th state and time period=t, the factor prices
derived from first-order conditions are as follows:

























Under the full employment conditions for all factors, income share for each factor is as
follows:
Labor income share: Y Li,t = βYi,t
Capital income share: Y Ki,t = αYi,t
Land income share: Y Wi,t = (1− α− β)Yi,t
(i=1,2 & t=1,2....n)
(3.3)
Inside this monetary union, factors such as capital and labor move freely between the
two states without any barrier, but land is immovable. Thus, the two states have equal
after-tax real rent income for capital and after-tax real wage for labor, but may not have
equal after-tax real rent income for the immovable factor, land.
Equal after-tax real factor income conditions for labor and capital between two states
are as follows:
For real wage of labor: (1− λL1 )(
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For real rent of capital: (1− λK1 )(
RK
P




For real rent of land: (1− λW1 )(
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i are ith state tax rates on incomes from labor, capital, and land,
respectively. These tax rates on factor incomes are determined by state governments.
The first major implication of equal after-tax real factor income conditions is that no
state government in this monetary union can arbitrarily decide the tax rate on real rent of
capital or real wage of labor. Before deciding the tax rates for labor and capital incomes,
a state government must conform to the equal after-tax real income conditions for both
labor and capital. If one state increases the tax rate on the real rent of capital or the real
wage of labor, and violates the equal after-tax real factor income conditions, then capital or
labor moves from the state that has the lower after-tax real rent or wage to the state that
has the higher. This effect continues until the marginal productivity of capital or labor of
the original state increase sufficiently to satisfy these conditions again. Losing factors to
another state consequently reduces the total output and tax revenue for the original state.
But provided, however, that the tax is not higher than real rent income from land, each
government can apply any tax rate on the real rent of land since this factor is immovable.
The maximum tax rate for land income in any state can be between 0 and 100%.
A second implication is that both states must have equal after-tax risk-free interest rates.
The risk-free rate for each state is determined by its real rent of capital. The after-tax real
rent of capital is the same for both states.











The equal after-tax risk-free interest rate condition for two states:
(1− λk1)Rf,1,t = (1− λk2)Rf,2,t = rf,t (3.6)
3.2 Demand for Goods and Services
For every state, the demand for goods and services is the sum of current period con-
sumption, investment, government spending, and net export,
Yi,t = Ci,t + Ii,t +Gi,t +NXi,t; (i=1,2 & t=1,2,....n) (3.7)
Interstate trade between the two states inside the union comprises the net export. We
assume that net trade is exogenously determined for each state in this model. The demand
for private investment goods is determined by the capital accumulation process in every
state,
Ii,t = Ki,t − (1− δ) Ki,t−1; (i=1,2 & t=1,2,....n) (3.8)
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where δ=capital depreciation rate. However, the demand for goods and services due to
private consumption and government spending in each state arises through intertemporal
two-period utility maximizations by private individuals and through government budget
constraint, respectively.
3.2.1 Government Spending
The government in every ith state allocates budgetary spending (Gi,t) for its operating
and capital expenditures at every time period=t, and this Gi,t is exogenously determined by
ith state at time period t. Thus, it collects taxes (Tit) on the labor, capital, and land incomes
of individual residences (the tax rates on land, labor, and capital income are exogenously















= λLi βYi,t + λ
K
i αYi,t + λ
W
i (1− β − α)Y Wi,t
(3.9)
We assume that every state government in the union has the self-interest to maximize
budget spending, but states cannot run a ponzi scheme and do not receive the seigniorage
revenue from the central bank. We also assume that a government can issue a one-year
maturity debt (bi) at any period t = t with an interest rate rm. This debt matures during
the next period. At t=1, the government budget constraint for ith state in the monetary
union is:
Gi,1 = Ti,1 + bi,1 (3.10)
At t=2, the budget constraint becomes:
Gi,2 = Ti,2 − (1 + rm,i)bi,1 (3.11)
The implications of this budget constraint are that a government in the monetary union
can finance its budget spending by tax revenue and by borrowing from the financial market.
A government can default at t=2 and avoid paying accrued interest and principle for the
debt accumulated at period t=1, i.e., bi,1. In case of defaults, however, a government cannot
continue to have access to the capital market and cannot borrow to finance primary budget
deficits in the future. Thus, the budget constraint at t=2 implies,
Gi,2 = Ti,2 ( if defaults)
Gi,2 = Ti,2 − (1 + rm,i) bi,1 ( if does not default)
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3.2.2 Consumption
We assume that a representative individual of ith state makes consumption and savings
decisions between t=1 and 2 periods and maximizes his or her utility. He or she derives
utility from consumption, and his or her utility increases with consumption. At period t=1,
an individual of ith state earns after-tax labor income, yi,1 and consumes, ci,1. Savings,
yi,1 − ci,1, is invested in a diversified portfolio of assets and rk is the after-tax return from
kth asset. So, at period t=1, the individual budget constraint is,
ci,1 + si,1 = yi,1 (3.12)
At period t=2, this individual earns after-tax labor income, y2 and enjoys the previous
period′s after-tax investment income, [yi,1 − ci,1][
∑
wk(1 + rk)], where k=1,2,.....K assets.
At period t=2, the individual has the following budget constraint:
ci,2 = yi,2 + [(yi,1 − ci,1][
∑
[wk(1 + rk)] (3.13)
The maximization problem for this individual′s time additive utility can be written as:
max U(ci,1) + βE(ci,2) subject to ci,2 = yi,2 + [(yi,1 − ci,1][
∑
k[wk(1 + rk)], and
∑
wk = 1,



















E(1 + rk) = E(1 + rj)
(3.15)
The first of the equations in equation (3.15) estimates that an individual of ith state allocates
his or her resources between periods 1 and 2 so that he or she maximizes utility from
first-period consumption with a discounted expected utility from second-period consumption
weighted by the expected return from kth asset. The second of the equations in equation
(3.15) estimates that the individual allocates his or her savings in different assets in the
portfolio until the expected return from each asset is equal.
3.3 Municipal Bond Yield Determination
We assume that the representative individual residence of a state invests his or her
savings in a diversified portfolio of assets and he or she is a risk-averse investor. His or her
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portfolio consists of risk-free assets as well as risky municipal bonds. At t=1, this investor
knows the government spending, Gi,1, and tax income, Ti,1, when he or she buys state
government debts that will be matured at period, t=2. Although he or she is aware of
the fact that at t=2 period, a government must maintain the budget constraint (3.11) or
default, government spending, Gi,2, and tax income, Ti,2, at period t=2 are unknown to
him or her.
If ‘pii’ is the probability of default (PD) of the i
th state government over a 1-year horizon,
and ‘xei ’ is the expected loss given default (LGD) by investors if i
th state defaults during
t=2 period. If rm,i is the yield on the government bond of i
th state at t=1 period, then the
expected return for a risk-averse investor from the government bond of ith state is,
E(1 + rm,i) = (1 + rm,i)(1− pii) + (1 + rm,i − xei )(pii) = 1 + rf
or, rm,i = rf + piix
e
i
or, rm,i − rf = piixei
(3.16)
Equation (3.16) states that the yield on a state bond is a function of the risk-free interest
rate and expected loss (EL = pixe) for investors from that bond, whereas the probability
of default of a borrower state (PD) and the expected loss given default (LGD) determine
the expected loss (EL). Another interpretation is that the spread between yield on a state
bond and the risk-free rate is the risk premium, which is equal to expected loss (EL) from
that bond.
3.3.1 Risk-Free Rate and Expected Loss
The risk-free rate is the foundation for pricing a municipal bond, and it sets the floor
for the borrowing cost of a U.S. state. Any up or down movement of the risk-free interest
rate should immediately change the yields on municipal bonds in the same direction. In
this model, the risk-free rate is equal to the marginal product or real rent of capital, and
it is subject to random exogenous productivity shocks. Each state has the similar risk-free
rate because of arbitrage activity, and any exogenous shock that changes the productivity
of capital in the union also changes the real interest rate.
Expected loss (EL) is the loss that may have to be incurred by investors as a result of
lending to a risky borrower state. EL is calculated by multiplying probability of default
(PD) and loss given default (LGD) as a percentage of loan exposure amount, and is equal to
the risk premium that investors receive as a compensation for lending to a risky state. The
higher is the expected loss by investors, the larger is the risk premium investors demand
over risk-free interest rate.
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When a state becomes unable to service its debt, it can default completely on its debt, or
it can negotiate with creditors for a partial default. In case of partial default, the defaulting
state and its creditors negotiate to settle the amount of loss given default (haircut) that
creditors must accept. Therefore, expected loss given default (haircut) is an important
determinant of yields on municipal bonds. The amount of haircut investors might incur is
a function of the existing debt and fiscal health of a state, and the ability and willingness
of the federal government to make intergovernmental transfer.
In this macroeconomic model, the most important factor that impacts the default
probability of a borrowing government in the monetary union is the existing stock of debt
and current borrowing. If any state government in this monetary union runs a budget
deficit, it must borrow from the financial market. A persistent budget deficit forces this
state to accumulate debt, and the state must achieve a larger primary budget surplus in the
future as the size of the debt level grows. Consequently, the default probability of the state
increases with the increase of debt stock, and so does the borrowing cost for this state. In
addition, an increasing borrowing cost also worsens the financial situation of a state and its
default probability further increases. Therefore, the stock of debt and default probability
of a state have a nonlinear relationship (Goldstein & Woglom, 1991).
This model also anticipates that the default probability of a borrower government is
influenced by factors that are exogenously determined. The higher the probability or
frequency of these exogenous shocks, the larger the default probability of a government,
and the higher would be its borrowing cost. Therefore, exogenous shocks (on both supply
and demand sides of a state economy) influence the yield on the municipal bond.
Sudden shocks to factor productivities (labor, land, and capital), a substantial migration
of labor from one state to another (due to some adverse public policies in the original state),
natural disasters, epidemics, and oil price hikes may create shocks to the supply side of
the economy of a state. These exogenous shocks cause the output of a state to decline,
which ultimately leads to lower tax revenue as well as to, on some occasions, higher public
spending. In response to these conditions, a state government may default to service the
debt.
An exogenous demand shock, such as a business recession or financial crisis, reduces
investment expenditure, consumption, and interstate trade. In addition, the size of the
unemployed population often increases, and the size of the tax paying employed labor force
decreases. Thus, a downward pressure on all types of factor income takes place, which
ultimately dampens the tax revenue for a state government. A rising default probability
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for a state government is the ultimate outcome.
3.4 Demand for Funds by a State Government
The demand for funds by a state government depends on its decision to finance the
budget by taxation or by borrowing, that is, the size of the primary budget surplus/deficit.
Two important factors that influence deficit financing decisions are fiscal institutions and
political institutions.
3.4.1 Fiscal Institutions
States in the U.S. monetary union have different fiscal institutions. With the exception
of Vermont, each state has a balanced budget requirement, but the stringency of these
requirements varies widely (Mitchell & Tuszynsky, 2011). These balanced budget require-
ments can be categorized into four groups. In 44 states, a budget proposed by the governor
must be balanced. This is weakest of all balanced budget rules. In 37 of these states,
the enacted budget must be balanced, while the actual revenues and expenditures can be
subtracted from the balance if expectation differs from realization. In 6 states, deficits in
one period must be corrected in the next, and in 24 of the 37 states no deficit can be carried
forward from one fiscal period to another. This is the strictest of all balanced budget rules
(Poterba & Rueben, 1999).
The second fiscal institutions is debt limit, which is any type of debt restrictions that
account for a state′s constitutional and/or legislative limit when issuing long-term general
obligation bonds and/or the limits on the amount of debt outstanding. Ten states have
no debt restrictions. Of the other 40 states, 38 have constitutional and the other two have
legislative restrictions (Poterba & Rueben, 1999).
The final two fiscal institutions are revenue limit and expenditure limit. These rules
determine the constitutional and/or legislative limit(s) within a state for tax or expenditure.
The objective of these rules is to control the growth of governments. They limit the growth
rate of revenue or expenditure to the growth rate of state residents′ personal income, the
state population,and the inflation rate, or some combination of all three. Twenty-eight
states implemented these laws (Mitchell & Tuszynsky, 2011).
3.4.2 Political Institutions
Political institutions often influence states′ fiscal profligacies, tax increases, or public
borrowings and, therefore, have an impact on the demand for funds by a state from the
financial market, and thus, on its borrowing cost. The political institutions that have the
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greatest impact and the greatest effect in this model are the party affiliations of the governor
and the majority members in the senate or house of a state; the size of the legislative
branches of a state, such as the total numbers of senate and house seats; a split legislature,
that is whether two houses are ruled by the two different parties; and labor union density
in a state.
The party affiliations of the governor and the status of senate or house members are
proxies for conservative and liberal political forces that have different ideological views
regarding the intergenerational transfer of wealth. Conservative forces often limit the size
of the fiscal budget, contravene against higher taxes, or discourage public borrowings, but
they often achieve these ends by cutting the public goods to society. The third political
institution is the size of a state′s legislature, i.e., the total numbers of senate and house
members. A state government′s size often determines the impact of the larger legislative
body on government spending. Electorates have self-interest to internalize the benefit of
public projects, but due to cost sharing they also underestimate project costs. Thus, the
size of the legislative body is associated with the amount of government spending. A larger
state legislature usually increases the government spending for the state. The fourth political
institution, the presence of a split legislature, deters a single party from dominating public
budgeting and, thus, checks the fiscal profligacy.
The final political institution is the organized labor in a state. This interest group
impacts the size and composition of a state budget. This study assumes that a state with
a larger union membership or strong collective bargaining is less capable of undertaking
painful fiscal austerities in the case of fiscal crisis and thus, is more prone to debt repayment
default.
3.5 Conclusion of the Macroeconomics Model
The municipal bonds issued by U.S. states vary in basic characteristic factors. These
factors include (a) the issue size of a bond, (b) the existence of call provision for a bond, (c)
the maturity of a bond, (d) the eligibility of interest income from the bond for a state tax,
(e) the credit rating of a bond, (f) the bond is insured by a third party, and (g) the method
of a bond′s sale, as competition or negotiation. Other than the default probability (PD) and
loss given default (LGD), these bond factors also determine the spread between the yields
of a state bond and the risk-free debt, as shown in equation (3.15). The issue size of a bond
is expected to have a negative effect on yield because a large volume of a particular bond
offers higher liquidity for the investors. Therefore, investors may receive lower yields from
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a bond with a larger issue. A callable municipal bond offers a higher positive risk premium
than a non-call protected bond, since call protection provides the issuer an opportunity
to buy back the existing bond for a predetermined price when the market interest rate
is lower (Rosenbloom, 1976). Since the price of a bond is determined by the discounted
value of future cash flow, the price of a longer maturity bond is more vulnerable to market
interest rate changes than the price of a shorter maturity bond. Since market interest rate
is often volatile and this volatility creates interest rate risk for investors′ portfolios, a longer
maturity bond often compensates investors with a higher return. Poterba (1999) and Liu
and Thakor (1984) estimate risk premiums for municipal bonds if interest income from
the bonds is eligible for a state tax, or if the bonds have lower credit ratings. In addition,
Johnson and Kriz (2005) find that insurance offered by a third party negatively affects yields
on municipal bonds because insured bonds have a lower risk of nonpayment. Finally, yields
on municipal bonds differ if a bond is offered by negotiation or by competitive bidding.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
MACROECONOMIC MODEL-I
In this chapter, an empirical analysis is conducted to estimate the impact of different
variables (shocks) on the borrowing cost of a state as prescribed by the macroeconomic
model. This model predicts that yield on municipal bonds for a state is a function of risk-free
interest rate and expected loss (EL) for investors from lending to the state, whereas expected
loss (EL = pixe) is the product of probability of default (PD) of a state and expected loss
given default (LGD) of that state for investors. Although risk-free interest rate can be
modeled using yields on U.S. treasury securities as an instrument variable, expected loss for
an investor is not observable. It is a latent variable. Nevertheless, the expected loss (latent
variable) can be determined by a linear combination of several instrumental variables, such
as the credit rating of a state, fiscal and political institutions, and important macroeconomic
variables. Let us assume that ′X ′ is the vectors of all explanatory variables that are linearly
related with the expected loss (EL) variable, then the linear function can be written as,
EL = βX + 
A linear regression model based on equation (3.10) can be written as,
rm,i = (1− t)rf + βXi + i
where ‘i’ represents the ith state. ‘t’ is the federal tax rate on risk-free treasury bond
yield. In equilibrium,‘t’ is determined by the income tax rate of the marginal buyer of a
tax-exempt municipal bond. This linear model relates different predictor variables (shocks)
to a specific response variable, namely the yields of general obligation bonds, and can be
estimated using fixed effect or least square dummy (LSDV) panel data regression technique.
A panel regression method is widely used to estimate a linear model. This technique
depicts the relationship between a set of predictor variables (Xs) and a response variable (Y)
when a dataset follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple
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observations on each individual in the sample (Hsiao, 2003). For a linear relationship, the







γtTt + β1Xit,1 + β2Xit,2 + ....+ βpXit,p + it (4.1)
where αs and γs are coefficients for ‘N’ cross section and ‘T’ time dummies that mimic the
individual and time effects in panel regression. βs are coefficients of predictors′ variables and
 is the disturbance term. If X is the (n∗p) matrix of predictor variables with n observations,
then the regression model can be written as a vector form: Y = Xβ + , where Y and  are
the (n ∗ 1) vectors of the response variable and the disturbances, respectively, and β is the
(p ∗ 1) vector of coefficients.
The LSDV method uses the ordinary least square (OLS) technique that minimizes the∑
(2) with respect to β and finds an estimator of β: βˆ=(XX
′
)−1X ′Y . The estimated βˆ is
considered the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE); its variance, var(βˆ)=σ2(XX
′
)−1 is
the minimum, and it is unbiased among all of the linear estimators of β, provided that the
X matrix has the full rank. In addition, this estimator of β is also the Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) and is the most efficient among all estimators of β as long as disturbances
are normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, ∼N(0, σ2In).
4.1 Bond Characteristics, Institutions, and State Economy
The first empirical work estimates a linear model that relates predictor variables-the
municipal bond characteristic factor to a specific response variable- the yields of general
obligation bonds state fiscal institutions, political institutions, and state economic variables
to a specific response variable- the yields of general obligation bonds after controlling for
the municipal bond characteristic factors. Table (4.1) summarizes these variables. The
regression model is founded on equation (4.1) and is depicted as follows:
















The response variable in this LSDV regression analysis for equation (4.2) is the primary
market yields on municipal bonds issued by state governments in the U.S. monetary union.
The dataset of this response variable covers a total of 17,400 general obligation bonds issued
in the primary market by 37 states between the years 2001 and 2011. This bond dataset is
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collected from the Mergents Bond Viewer data base for U.S. taxable and municipal bonds.
This sample is chosen based upon the availability of the most recent data, the size of the
data, and the time and budget constraints of the researcher. As an example, this sample
includes 371 states rather than all 50 because the other 132 states did not offer general
obligation bonds during the sample period.
The first predictor variable is the pre-tax treasury yields. The pre-tax municipal yields
are matched with pre-tax treasury yields by the date of sales (month/year) and number
of years to maturity of municipal bonds for each month of the year, lasting from 2001 to
2011. Although the number of years to maturity for municipal bonds ranges from 1 to 35
years, treasury securities are offered only for the following maturities: 1-month, 3-month,
6-month, 1-year, 2- year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year. Therefore, in
order to match pre-tax municipal bond yields with pre-tax treasury yields by the number of
years to maturity, the yield curves for treasury securities that cover from 1 year to 35 years
are constructed in the form of a spline function for each month of the year from 2001 to
2011. This spline function estimates the yield to maturity as a linear function of maturities
(Johnson & Kriz, 2005). The data for the treasury yields are collected from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Fiscal institutions are the second set of predictor variables. These are the ACIR in-
dex, debt limit, revenue limit, and expenditure limit. The ACIR variable is an index of
constitutional and legislative limits of fiscal deficit for each state. As previously noted,
with the exception of Vermont, each state has a balanced budget requirement, but the
stringency of these requirements varies widely (Mitchell & Tuszynsky, 2011). A balanced
budget rules-based index has been developed by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR, 1987) based on the existence and implementation of balanced budget rules.
This ACIR index for budget stringency ranges from 0 (for states with very lax antifiscal
deficit rules) to 10 (for states with very stringent fiscal deficit rules).
Political institutions are the third set of predictor variables, and include the party
affiliations of the governor and the party affiliations of the majority senate or house members
of a state, the size of a state′s legislative branches (the total numbers of senate and house
1Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West virginia, and Wisconsin.
2Not included in data set: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington D.C, and Wyoming.
24
seats), the existence of a split legislative body ruled by two different parties, and the labor
union density in a state.
The governor affiliation variable takes the value 1 if the governor of a state is affiliated
with the Republican Party and 0 otherwise. The senate affiliation variable takes the value 1
if the majority of senate members are affiliated with the Republican Party and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the house affiliation variable takes the value 1 if the majority of house members
are affiliated with the Republican Party and 0 otherwise. Therefore, all three are dummy
variables.
The size of legislative variable measures the total number of members in both the house
and senate of a state. A split legislature, a dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the senate
and house of a state are ruled by two different parties. Data for these two variables are
collected from the U.S. census bureau. Organized labor in a state is accounted for according
to the union density by state. It equals the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary
workers (including public sector employees) who are union members in a state. The data for
union density by state are collected from the works of Hirsch et al. (2014). A description
of the data base can be found in Hirsch et al. (2001).
A fourth set is statewise economic variables vulnerable to exogenous shocks. They carry
those shocks to a state′s repayment capacity of existing debt and should be priced in the
municipal bond market. Five state economic variables are identified.
One variable is unemployment for each state. This variable represents a state′s rev-
enue/tax production capacity. A larger unemployed population in a state generates less tax
revenue and also increases the welfare expenditure for a state. The unemployment variable
is the number of people unemployed in a state as a percentage of the total labor force in
a state. Unemployment data are collected from the Bureau of Labor Studies. The second
variable is Home price index (HPI) that concerns the wealth of state residences and the
state government. Higher home prices also represent higher tax revenue for school districts
and local governments, which ultimately relieve the state from having to support local
governments′ fiscal budgets. HPI data are collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Data Base (FRED).
The following three variables represent present and future fiscal obligations for a state:
budget deficit, existing debt, and public pension funding. Since a state does not have any
seigniorage revenue, all budget deficit must be financed by borrowing from the municipal
bond market. Thus, the budget deficit of a state represents an increase to its existing debt
level and future obligations for repaying and servicing these debts. The existing debt of a
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state demands servicing of the debt by interest payment and repayment of principals for
matured debts. Thus, a larger debt obligation of a state creates fiscal pressure for a state and
diverts money from development, education, and welfare. Budget deficit and existing debt
variables are standardized by dividing them with the respective state′s personal income.
The data are collected from the United States Census Bureau.
The public pension obligation of a state is represented by creating a variable pension
fund of a state. The pension fund is the ratio of the actuarial asset and liability of a state for
a year. During the past several years, state governments have been increasingly under fiscal
pressure due to rising public pension costs and liability. The recent recession has made the
situation worse for most states. The actuarial firm Milliman estimates a 1.2 trillion dollar
gap for the largest 100 U.S. public pension plans (Sielman & Rebecca, 2012). Since today′s
underfunded state public pension system will be a substantial future fiscal obligation for
states, this study examines whether the municipal bond market demands a risk premium
for this looming fiscal risk. The pension funding ratio dataset is collected from the pension
data base of the Center of Retirement Research, administered by Boston College.
The control variables are derived from the bond-specific factors that affect the yield on
a municipal bond in the primary market. Factors include the issue size of a bond, the
existence of call provision for a bond, the maturity of a bond, the state tax on interest
income from the bond, the credit rating of a bond, a bond′s insurance by a third party, and
the method of sale for a bond, i.e., whether it is sold competitively or by negotiation. The
issue size of a bond is expected to have a negative effect on yield because a large volume of
a particular bond offers higher liquidity for the investors. Therefore, investors may receive
lower yields from a bond with a larger issue. A callable municipal bond offers a higher
positive risk premium than a noncall protected bond, since call protection provides the
issuer an opportunity to buy back the existing bond for a predetermined price when the
market interest rate is lower (Rosenbloom, 1976). Since the price of a bond is determined
by the discounted value of future cash flow, the price of a longer maturity bond is more
sensitive to market interest rate change than the price of a shorter maturity bond. Since
market interest rate is often volatile and this volatility creates interest rate risk for investors′
portfolios, a longer maturity bond often compensates investors with a higher return. Poterba
(1999) and Liu and Thakor (1984) estimate risk premiums for municipal bonds if interest
income from the bonds is eligible for a state tax, or if the bonds have lower credit ratings.
In addition, Johnson and Kriz (2005) find that insurance offered by a third party negatively
affects yields on municipal bonds because insured bonds have a lower risk of nonpayment.
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Finally, yields on municipal bonds differ if a bond is offered by negotiation, or by competitive
bidding.
The issue size variable is the logarithmic value of the issue amount of a municipal
bond while the bond is sold. Dummy variables, such as option, insurance, state tax, and
negotiation, are employed to control the impacts of call provision, insurance offered by a
third party, state tax on interest income, and the use of negotiation for sale. In order to
capture the maturity effect on yields, two maturity-based dummy variables are employed:
short (for bonds with maturity between 1-5 years) and medium (for bonds with maturity
between 6-12 years). Credit ratings for a municipal bond are collected from three rating
agencies: Moody, S&P, and The Fitch. These nonnumeric bond ratings are then converted
into ordinal variables by assigning a numeric value to each rating group: 0 for the highest
credit quality (AAA), 1 for very high credit quality (AA), 2 for high credit quality (A), 3
for good credit quality (BBB), and 4 for all other speculative grades and nonrated bonds.
The rating variable is created by taking the numeric value of the highest of the three credit
ratings. The data for all these bond factors are collected from the Mergents Bond Viewer
data base for U.S. taxable and municipal bonds.
Table (4.2) summarize the estimated fixed effect (LSDV) regression results that regress
yields on municipal bonds against fiscal institutions, political institutions, and state econ-
omy, after controlling a bond′s characteristics factors. These fixed effect estimations also
calculate robust standard error for inference purposes in order to control the presence of
heteroskedasticity in error terms. In table (4.2) for the full sample, the estimated results
provide a good fit between the data and the actual municipal bond yields. The R-square
value (0.87) shows that the model predicts 87% variation in yields on municipal bonds. The
coefficients for all but one explanatory variables (state tax) are statistically significant. The
coefficient of the treasury variable is 0.57, which means this model predicts a 43% tax rate
for marginal investors of municipal bonds. The coefficients for all bond factor variables′ are
statistically significant and stable in the full sample, and with some reasonable exceptions,
also in other three shorter, medium, and longer maturity samples. Issue size is priced in
the municipal bond market. This model estimates a yield increase of 0.03% if issue size
increases by 1%. This model also estimates the risk premiums for call provision, insurance
offered by a third party, and the negotiation offering method, as expected. It predicts
0.12% or 0.04% higher yields if a municipal bond has a call option or has one additional
group of lower credit ratings. Additionally, the model predicts 0.12% and 0.14% lower
yields for both cases if a bond is insured by a third party and offered by negotiation, rather
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than by competitive bid. The maturity effect is also being priced in the municipal bond
market as expected. Shorter and medium maturity bonds offer 1.17% and 0.10% lower
yields than longer maturity municipal bonds. In addition, a shorter maturity bond and a
medium maturity bond offer 0.09% and 0.07% higher yields, respectively, for 1 additional
year of maturity. Finally, this model does not offer any risk premium if interest income
from municipal bond is subjected to the state tax by the issuer state.
It is clear that signs and strengths of coefficients, as well as statistical significances of
all bond factor variables, remain unchanged across the maturity groups (stable), except the
option, credit rating, and state tax variables. The option dummy variable has a statistically
significant coefficient for the full sample, long; but a statistically insignificant coefficient for
the short and the medium maturity sample. For a short or a medium maturity bond, there
may not be much interest rate risk for investors if a call option exists. The credit rating
variable is statistically significant and has expected positive signs for the full sample, the
medium maturity sample; but the coefficients are statistically insignificant for the short and
long maturity sample. In addition, the coefficient of state tax is statistically insignificant
for all samples except long maturity.
The coefficients for all fiscal institution variables except revenue limit are statistically
significant for the full sample. For every additional point in the (1-10) ACIR scale, the
municipal bond market reduces the interest rate for a state by 0.006%. The municipal bond
market offers 0.04% and 0.02% lower interest rates for a state that has a constitutional limit
on expenditure and debt. The coefficients of all the fiscal institution variables, however, are
not stable and significant across the three maturity samples. The coefficient of the ACIR
(the balanced budget rules index) is significant in the full sample and the short, medium
and long maturity sample. On the other hand, the coefficient of the expenditure limit
is statistically significant and stable for the full sample and also for the medium and the
short maturity sample. The coefficient of debt limit is statistically significant only for full
sample. In addition, the revenue limit fiscal institution variable is statistically significant
in full sample and in short and longer maturity samples.
All but one of the political variables are statistically significant for the full sample,
and signs and magnitudes do not follow the expectations of this study. The municipal
bond market reduces the interest rate for a state by 0.13% and 0.03%, respectively, if a
majority of senate and house members are affiliated with the Republican Party. Surprisingly,
the municipal bond market charges 0.04% higher interest rate for a state that has a split
legislature, i.e., senate and house are ruled by two different parties. The municipal bond
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market also demands a 0.15% positive risk premium for the size of legislation variables.
For one additional legislator per capita, a state pays a 0.15% higher interest rate, which
seems a little too much. The municipal bond market prices union density in a state
adversely by charging 0.06% higher interest rate for 1% additional labor force covered by a
union or collective bargaining. Finally, the coefficient for governor affiliation is statistically
insignificant for full sample.
Again, coefficients of all the political institution variables are not stable and significant
across the three maturity samples. The coefficient of the governor affiliation variable is
statistically insignificant for the medium maturity samples but significant for the short and
long maturity sample. The Coefficient of house affiliation variable is insignificant in all but
the long maturity sample but the coefficient of the senate affiliation variable is stable and
significant across all three maturity samples. For the size of legislation and split legislature
variables, the coefficient of size legislation is insignificant for all three maturity samples,
but the coefficient of split legislation is significant for all but the short maturity sample.
The coefficient for the union density variable is stable and significant in all three maturity
samples.
Among the state economic variables, unemployment is statistically insignificant and
has the opposite effect than expected. Both debt and deficit variables generate statistically
significant coefficients. For 1% additional debt/income or deficit/income, a state is punished
with 0.02% and 0.002% additional borrowing costs, respectively. It seems that the municipal
bond market cares more about the past accumulated debt than the current period deficit.
The Home price index (HPI) is also statistically significant. A 1% additional HPI rewards
a state with 0.001% lower borrowing costs. Finally, the pension funding variable produces
a statistically significant coefficient. States are punished by 0.002% additional borrowing
costs if the pension funding ratio of a state deteriorates by 1%.
Across the maturity based samples, the significance of state economy variables show
mixed results. The coefficient of debt variable is insignificant for all samples, whereas
the coefficient of deficit variable is significant only for the long maturity sample. The
coefficient for the home price index is significant for all but the short maturity sample, but
the coefficient for the pension fund is insignificant for all three maturity-based samples.
4.2 Model Diagnostic Test
Although this study successfully developed a regression model based on bond character-
istics, fiscal institutions, political institutions, and state economic variables, and fit the data
with a 87% R-square value, it is essential to diagnose the BLUE properties of the estimator
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of the coefficients. One starting point would be to estimate the multicollinearity among
the independent variables, i.e., estimating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Any VIF
value greater than 10 would be an indicator of higher correlation among the independent
variables. From the regression model of equation (4.2), the mean VIF score for all regressors
is calculated to be 4.17. Overall, it can be safely inferred that linear dependence among
regressors in this model is negligible, and the estimators of the coefficients for this regression
model retained the BLUE property.
Three F-tests examine whether all bond character factors, all fiscal institutions, and all
budget variables are blockwise jointly zero. These F-tests show that the coefficients for all
groups are block wise jointly nonzero (p-value less than 1%). Thus, the presence of these
three groups of variables in the regression model is justified. Thus, no risk factors should
be dropped from the regression model even if any factor is statistically insignificant based
on an individual t-test.
Next, the assumption of normality of the error term could be another property to
examine for the regression model. The assumption that errors of the regression model
follow normal distribution, ∼N(0, σ2In), is essential for the estimators of the coefficients
to be the most efficient estimators among all classes of estimators. A standard Jarque-Bera
test for normality of error term is used for this study to examine the validity of the above
mentioned assumption. For this regression model, the JB statistics is calculated as 594880.
The chi-square critical value at the 5% level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom is 5.99.
Thus, the null hypothesis of normality is rejected. Since the regression model generated
nonnormal error terms, the estimators of the coefficients for this regression model may
not be the most efficient. Thus, t-statistics calculated for statistical inference should be
accepted with caution.
4.3 Model Validation
Model validation refers to finding the correct model, stability, and robustness of estima-
tors of the regression coefficients, as well as the plausibility and usability of the regression
function for prediction and ability to generate inferences drawn from the regression function
(Oredein et al., 2011). Snee (1977) emphasized the model validation by arguing that data
collected without the aid of an experimental design may have several defects. Both the
dependent and independent variables may contain errors, both types of variables may
not have sufficient variations, and important variables may be missing. Thus, some type
of validation should be made before using any model for prediction. There are several
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methods for model validation, e.g., cross validation, bootstrapping, etc. Each validation
model has advantages and disadvantages. Oredein et al. ( 2011) estimated several model
validation techniques for a regression model and found that bootstrapping provides the
lowest prediction errors.
Bootstrapping avoids any assumption of the distribution for a population or for an
estimated population parameter. The bootstrap method selects B number of indepen-
dent bootstrap samples (X∗1, X∗2, .....X∗b) of size n drawn from the original sample (F)
with replacement: X∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3, ......x∗n); F = (x1, x2, x3, ......xn), where star sign (*)
indicates X∗ is a re-sample version of X. Then it calculates the bootstrap replication
θˆ∗ = (θˆ∗1, θˆ∗2, θˆ∗3, ......θˆ∗b) of the estimator, θˆ = S(x) of the population parameter (θ).
The bootstrap standard error is seB(θˆ) = [1/B
∑B
1 θˆ
∗(b) − θˆ]. Singh (1981) proved that
when n→∞, the bootstrap distribution of θˆ∗(b)− θˆ also follows the distribution of θˆ − θ.
The bootstrap 100(1-) confidence interval for θˆ can be written as [tb,α/2 × seb(θˆ) < θˆ <
tb,1−α/2 × seb(θˆ)].
Table (4.3) summarizes the bootstrapping results of the regression model in equation
(4.2). Fifty (50) bootstrap samples are generated randomly to estimate the equation (4.1)
regression model, and each sample has 6,000 data points.
The bootstrap statistics show that all the coefficients estimated from equation (4.2) are
statistically significant except the state tax, revenue limit, and governor affiliation. Thus,
no substantial anomalies are found between classical inference and the bootstrap inference.
Therefore, the bootstrap method validates most of the fixed effect (LSDV) estimation results
without any normality assumption in error terms.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The main findings of the empirical study are that yields on municipal general obligation
bonds in the primary market are responsive to fiscal institutions, political institutions, and
shocks to the economy of a borrowing state. By charging lower interest rates, the municipal
bond market rewards states that have prudent fiscal budget management and stronger
antideficit, balanced budget rules. In addition, states that are ruled by fiscally conservative
political forces are also rewarded with lower borrowing costs. Two important economic
variables, debt and pension funding ratio, are identified as impactful in the municipal bond
market.
This macroeconomic model shows that spread between the borrowing cost of a state and
the risk-free rate is a function of the default probability (PD) of the state government and
loss given default (LGD) for investors. In this macroeconomic model framework, the prob-
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ability of default is determined simultaneously by the intertemporal utility maximization
behaviors of investors (consumers) and the ability of a state government to maintain its
budget constraints. In theory, the factors identified and discussed by the model account for
the exogenous shocks to a state government′s finance, which influence its default probability.
These factors are fiscal institutions, political institutions, and state economy.
General obligation municipal bonds show a substantial variation in bond-specific char-
acteristics, such as issue size, maturity, call option, third-party insurance, credit ratings,
state taxation, and offer method (negotiated versus competitive bids), etc. This study
finds a statistically significant risk premium for every bond-specific factor, except state tax.
A bond that has a larger issue size, a higher credit rating, and is covered by third-party
insurance, or is offered by negotiation instead of competitive bids, is priced higher (offers
lower yield) in the primary market. On the other hand, if the bond has a call option, it
is priced lower (offers a higher yield) in the primary market. This study reveals that the
primary market for general obligation bonds is also segmented among short-, medium-, and
long-term maturities. Bonds of short-term (1-5 years) and medium-term maturities (6-12
years) offer on average 1.39% and 1.20% lower yields, respectively, than bonds of long-term
maturities (Table 4.2). These findings support the arguments of Rosenbloom (1976) as
well as Kidwell and Koch (1983). The results have potential implications for the fiscal
management of a state. In normal economic conditions, unless fiscal authorities expect a
drastic up or down movement of future market interest rates, they could keep borrowing
costs lower by issuing short- or medium-term bonds and foregoing the call option right.
Attracting a third-party insurer to insure the debt payment in case of default could also
lower the borrowing cost. One future extension of this research would be to examine the
influence of the expected movements of future risk-free interest rates (treasury yield curve)
to the risk premium for bonds with longer maturity and a call option. The hierarchical
linear model could provide a very useful methodology for this research.
This study estimates that states that have stronger antideficit rules also have lower
borrowing costs. It also finds that states with legislative and constitutional limits on fiscal
expenditures and debt borrow with lower interest rates in the primary market. These
findings confirm the arguments of Poterba and Rueben (1999). Future research might
examine whether antideficit fiscal rules are counterproductive during business downturns,
when states cannot increase fiscal expenditures to fight recessions. As a result, the inability
of states to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies may prolong the lengths of recessions.
The municipal bond market, then, could price these fiscal institutions negatively during
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recessions.
The municipal bond market rewards states with lower borrowing costs if they are
governed by fiscally conservative forces. This empirical study finds that the municipal
bond market reduces interest rates for a state if majority members of the senate and house
are affiliated with the Republican Party, and it punishes a state with a larger senate and
house. In addition, the municipal bond prices union density in a state adversely by charging
a higher interest rate. Therefore, the market appears to consider organized labor a threat
to fiscal conservativeness.
Among the state economic variables that carry shocks to state public finance, unem-
ployed labor force, home price index, and public pension funding ratio emerge as statistically
significant. Among them, public pension funding ratio is positively priced, thus substan-
tiating present market concerns about U.S. states′ public pension systems. The municipal
bond market lowers borrowing cost for those states that have a better pension funding ratio
(actuarial asset / actuarial liability). The existing debt of a state is priced significantly in
the municipal bond market; it is one of the most important adverse economic shocks to
the default probability of a state government. The higher coefficient′s value for the debt
variable substantiates the argument that debt impacts the borrowing cost of a state in two
ways. First, higher debt increases default probability, as does the borrowing cost. Second,
increasing the borrowing cost also worsens the financial situation of a state and further
increases its default probability.
Finally, the bootstrap model validation techniques validate the statistical significances
of the municipal bond pricing model (equation 4.1) by repeating the fixed effect estimations
on 50 samples. This technique substantiates the hypothesis that most of the estimated
parameters for the model are stable, robust, and significant.
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Table 4.1. Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions, Political Institutions, and State Economic
Variables on Municipal Bond Yields.
.
Name of Variable Description of Variable
muniyield(n): Yield to maturity per year of a municipal bond with n year maturity
treasyield(n): Yield to maturity per year of a treasury bond with n year maturity
issue size: Logarithmic value of issue amount of a municipal bond
call option: 1 if there is an call option for a municipal bond
insurance: 1 if i-th municipal bond is insured by a third party
state tax : 1 if there is state tax on interest income of a municipal
negotiation: 1 if a municipal bond is offered by negotiation, not competitive bids
credit rating: Credit rating of a municipal bond
short: 1 if maturity of a bond is between 1-5 years
medium: 1 if maturity of a bond is between 6-12 years
maturity-short: Maturity of a bond if it has a shorter maturity
maturity-medium: Maturity of a bond if it has a medium maturity
ACIR: Balanced budget rules index value for a state at year t, ranges from
0 to 10
debt limit: 1 if a state has a limit to issue general obligation bonds
expenditure limit: 1 if a state has a limit for expenditure
revenue limit: 1 if a state has a limit for tax
governor affiliation: 1 if governor of a state is Republican
senate affiliation: 1 if majority senators are Republican
house affiliation: 1 if majority house members are Republican
split legislature: 1 if senate and house are ruled by two different parties
legislative size: Number of senate and house members together in a state
union density: Percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary workers who are union
members
unemployment: Unemployment rate in percentage of total labor force of a state
HPI: Both residential and non-residential home price index of a state
deficit/income: Amount of deficit budget for a state divided by personal income of a
state
debt/income: Outstanding debt of a state divided by personal income of a state
pension fund: Actuary funding ratio of a state’s public pensions
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Table 4.2. Fixed Effect (LSDV) Regressions Results for Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions,
Political Institutions, and State Economy on Municipal Bond Yields.
.












treasury 0.573 92.43 0.583 63.66 0.414 34.02 0.317 17.43
negotiate -0.146 -16.88 -0.146 -8.72 -0.164 -13.2 -0.122 -8.37
creditrating 0.035 8.82 0.014 1.44 0.013 2.54 0.008 1.23
lnissusize -0.032 -8.34 -0.026 -3.93 -0.043 -7.13 -0.031 -4.57
option 0.118 5.48 -0.083 -0.87 0.023 1.65 0.275 4.16
statetax 0.03 1.69 -0.17 -0.30 0.49 1.45 -0.042 -1.79
insurance -0.121 -14.86 -0.080 -3.12 -0.076 -5.87 -0.106 -10.98
smat -1.170 -35.68 – – – – –
mmat -0.974 -18.63 – – – – –
shortmat 0.087 17.11 – – – – –
medmat 0.067 16.10 – – – – –
maturity - - 0.082 16.04 0.093 24.61 0.035 25.94
ACIR -0.006 -4.12 -0.006 -2.16 -0.006 -2.83 -0.007 -2.76
spendlt -0.044 -6.73 -0.067 -4.82 -0.029 -3.29 -0.016 -1.35
revlt -0.007 -0.52 -0.055 -2.30 -0.003 -0.13 -0.048 -2.51
debtlt -0.018 -2.40 -0.013 -0.78 -0.012 -1.14 -0.004 0.37
govnaffil 0.008 1.05 -0.044 -2.27 0.018 1.67 0.054 5.03
senateaffil -0.129 -10.82 -0.070 -2.99 -0.141 -7.95 -0.167 -8.33
houseaffil -0.028 -2.42 -0.004 -0.19 -0.023 -1.4 -0.130 -5.12
splitlegis 0.039 4.49 -0.003 -0.18 0.036 3.13 0.054 3.22
size legislation 0.148 5.40 0.095 1.70 -0.003 -0.06 -0.049 -1.25
uniondensity 0.062 17.12 0.030 4.04 0.053 10.28 0.072 12.25
unemployment -0.008 -1.84 -0.064 -6.75 -0.058 -9.02 0.013 1.81
debt/income 0.015 3.34 0.009 0.81 -0.002 -0.38 -0.003 -0.42
deficit/income 0.002 2.15 -0.001 -0.21 0.003 1.74 0.006 3.2
Home Price -0.001 -8.82 0.000 1.74 -0.001 -7.11 -0.002 -16.66
pension fund -0.002 -2.36 0.000 0.04 0.000 -0.12 -0.001 -0.9
intercept -18.76 -4.90 -12.350 -1.57 2.330 0.39 9.514 1.73
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Table 4.3. Bootstrapping for Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions, Political Institutions, and
State Economy on Municipal Bond Yields.
.






treasury 0.573 0.006 92.43 0.005 108.65
negotiate -0.146 0.009 -16.88 0.009 -15.67
creditrating 0.035 0.004 8.82 0.004 9.24
lnissusize -0.032 0.004 -8.34 0.004 -8.39
option 0.118 0.021 5.48 0.017 6.81
statetax 0.03 0.020 1.69 0.019 1.78
insurance -0.121 0.008 -14.86 0.007 -17.33
smat -1.170 0.033 -35.68 0.031 -37.65
mmat -0.974 0.052 -18.63 0.040 -24.4
shortmat 0.087 0.005 17.11 0.006 15.4
medmat 0.067 0.004 16.1 0.003 20.04
fiscrest -0.006 0.001 -4.12 0.002 -3.81
spendlt -0.044 0.006 -6.73 0.006 -7.43
revlt -0.007 0.013 -0.52 0.014 -0.48
debtlt -0.018 0.007 -2.40 0.008 -2.55
govnaffil 0.008 0.008 1.05 0.007 1.17
senateaffil -0.129 0.012 -10.82 0.011 -12.05
houseaffil -0.028 0.012 -2.42 0.015 -1.91
splitlegis 0.039 0.009 4.49 0.010 3.86
size legislation 0.148 0.027 5.4 0.031 4.8
uniondensity 0.062 0.004 17.12 0.003 18.61
unemployment -0.008 0.004 -1.84 0.004 -2.23
debt/income 0.015 0.005 3.34 0.005 2.99
deficit/income 0.002 0.001 2.15 0.001 2.42
Home Price -0.001 0.000 -8.82 0.000 -10.5
pension fund -0.002 0.001 -2.36 0.001 -2.68
CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
MACROECONOMIC MODEL-II
In the next empirical analysis, effects of state fiscal budget compositions on municipal
bond yields are estimated by regressing a linear model that relates predictor variables-the
state fiscal budget components to a specific response variable (the yields of general obligation
bonds) after controlling the bond characteristics and fiscal institution variables. Table (5.1)
summarizes these variables. The linear model is founded in equation (4.1) and is depicted
as follows:












This linear model is estimated using the fixed effect or least square dummy variable (LSDV)
panel data regression technique. A panel regression method is widely used to estimate a
linear model in an empirical study. This technique depicts the relationship between a set
of predictor variables (Xs) and a response variable (Y) when a dataset follows a given
sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple observations on each individual
in the sample (Hsiao, 2003). For a linear relationship, the equation for least square dummy







γtTt + β1Xit,1 + β2Xit,2 + ....+ βpXit,p + it (5.2)
where αs and γs are the coefficients for ‘N ’ cross section and ‘T ’ time dummies that mimic
the individual and time effects in panel regression. βs are coefficients of predictor variables
and  is the disturbance term. If X is the (n ∗ p) matrix of predictor variables with n
observations, then the regression model can be written as a vector form: Y = Xβ+, where
Y and  are the (n ∗ 1) vectors of the response variable and the disturbances, respectively,
and β is the (p ∗ 1) vector of coefficients.
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The LSDV method uses the ordinary least square (OLS) technique that minimizes the∑
(2) with respect to β, and finds an estimator ofβ: βˆ=(XX
′
)−1X ′Y . The estimated βˆ is
considered the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE); its variance, var(βˆ)=σ2(XX
′
)−1 is
the lowest, and it is unbiased among the all linear estimators of β provided that X matrix
has the full rank. In addition, this estimator of β is also the Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(MLE) and is the most efficient among all the estimators of β as long as disturbances are
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, ∼N(0, σ2In).
5.1 Budget Components, Bond Characteristics, and
Institutions
Since the default risk of a borrowing state rises from the inability of that state to manage
its primary budget deficit and to service its existing debt, it is important for the municipal
bond market to understand the sources of the budget deficit, i.e., different components
of revenue and expenditure. A careful analysis of different components of revenue and
expenditure may reveal whether a state prudently manages its expenditures on current
operations, welfare payments, capital goods, etc., and/or if this state maximizes its revenues
from sources that do not jeopardize economic growth. Consequently, this study expects to
find that the municipal bond market rewards a state that maintains a pro-growth and
balanced budget with a lower borrowing cost and punishes a state that does the opposite,
because the municipal bond market is responsible for pricing the default risk of a borrowing
state and disciplines a fiscally irresponsible state with a higher borrowing cost.
Table (5.1) summarizes all fiscal budget variables along with other control variables.
Yearly data of fiscal budgets′ variables, i.e., both total revenue and expenditure and their
subcomponents, for each of the 37 states are collected from the U.S. census bureau. Total
revenue (totalrev) includes all the money a state government receives from external sources
during a fiscal year, net of refunds and other correcting transactions, and excludes debt
issuance, investment liquidation, or as agency transactions. Total expenditure (totalexp)
includes all the money paid out by a government, net of recoveries and other correcting
transactions, other than for retirement of debt, investment in securities, extension of credit,
or as agency transactions (www.census.govt). These two fiscal budget variables are bro-
ken down in order to examine whether various subcomponents of total revenue and total
expenditure also have similar effects of total revenue and total expenditure, respectively,
on a state′s borrowing cost. The revenue and expenditure of each state is broken down as
follows:
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total revenue= tax revenue + intergovernmental revenue + other revenue
total expenditure= current expenditure + capital expenditure + other expenditure
Tax revenue (taxrev) is defined as all the money a state receives during a year from the
public by imposing taxes and license fees that exclude employer and employee contributions
for retirements and social insurance purposes. The variable intergovernmental revenue
(intgovtrev) is defined as all the money a state receives during a year from other governments
as fiscal aids and grants. Other revenue (otherrev) is defined as all the money a state receives
during a year except tax and intergovernmental revenues.
Capital expenditure (capitalexp) is all expenditures a state makes during a year for
capital goods, such as construction or purchase of buildings, lands, and equipment. Current
operation (currentop) is the direct expenditure for salary and benefits for officers and
employees, and for supplies, materials, operating leases, etc. Other expenditure (other-
exp) is defined as all expenditures except expenditures for current operation and capital
outlay. These expenditures include intergovernmental expenditure, insurance and benefit
repayment, assistance and subsidies, and interest payment for debt. Primary surplus
(primarysurplus) is the fiscal surplus or deficit of a state before interest payment for debt
(www.census.govt).
All the state budget variables in this study are standardized by dividing these vari-
ables by state personal income. This study expects to estimate a robust and statistically
significant risk premium for each budget variable.
Table (5.2) summarizes the estimated fixed effect (LSDV) regression results that regress
yields on municipal bonds against bond characteristics, fiscal institutions, and fiscal budget
variables, i.e., total revenue and expenditure, as well as the components of these two
variables, for the full sample, as well as the short, the medium and the long maturity
sample. These fixed effect estimations also calculate robust standard error in order to
control the presence of heteroskedasticity in error terms. In table (5.2), for the full sample,
the estimated results provide a good fit between the data and the actual municipal bond
yields. The R-square value (0.88) shows that the model predicts 88% variation in yields on
municipal bonds. The coefficients for all explanatory variables are statistically significant
and robust. The coefficient of the treasury variable is 0.57, which means this model predicts
a 43% tax rate for marginal investors of municipal bonds. The coefficients for all bond factor
variables are statistically significant and stable in the full sample, and with some reasonable
exceptions, also in the other three short, medium, and long maturity samples. It is clear that
the signs and strengths of coefficients, as well as the statistical significances of all bond factor
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variables, remain unchanged across the maturity groups (stable), except the option, credit
rating, and state tax variables. The option dummy variable has a statistically significant
coefficients for the full sample, medium, and long maturity samples, but a statistically
insignificant coefficients for the short maturity sample. For a short maturity bond, there
is not much interest rate risk for investors if a call option exists. This result makes good
sense because in general, a call option is important for a bond that has a short maturity.
A short maturity bond does not usually suffer with interest rate fluctuations, and in most
cases, does not possess a call option. The credit rating variable is statistically significant
and has expected positive signs for the full sample and short and medium maturity samples,
but signs of the coefficient change for the long maturity sample. In addition, state tax is
statistically insignificant for all samples except long maturity.
In addition, the coefficients of all fiscal institution variables are statistically significant
and stable in the full sample, but the signs and magnitudes of all fiscal variables are not
stable across different maturity-based samples. The coefficient of the ACIR (the balanced
budget rules index) is statistically significant in the full sample but insignificant for the short,
medium, and long maturity samples. Only the coefficient of expenditure limit is statistically
significant and stable across the full and all three maturity samples. The negative coefficient
values of the ACIR and expenditure variables substantiate that the municipal bond market
rewards a state with a lower borrowing cost because of the state′s fiscal institutions. The
coefficient of debt limit is also statistically significant and stable for all samples except the
shorter and medium maturity sample, and carries a positive value. This positive coefficient
value of debt limit means that the municipal bond market demands a risk premium from
a state that has the constitutional limits to issue long-term general obligation bonds. This
risk premium is the highest and most robust for the longer maturity sample. The revenue
limit fiscal institution variable is statistically significant for the full sample, medium, and
longer maturity samples, and has positive sign. The municipal bond market demands a risk
premium from a state that has constitutional limits to increase revenue and to issue new
debt.
The coefficients for budget variables, both total revenue and total expenditure, are
statistically significant for the full sample but not for all three maturity groups. Among the
three maturity samples, only the long maturity sample generates statistically significant
coefficient for total revenue variables, and the long and medium maturity samples gen-
erate statistically significant coefficients for the total expenditure variable. These results
show that the municipal bond market as a whole and the longer maturity bond market
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price total revenue positively by lowering borrowing costs for states. These negative risk
premiums are 0.01% for the full sample and the long maturity sample, for 1% additional
total revenue/personal income. In contrast, the municipal bond market prices the total
expenditure negatively by increasing the borrowing cost for states. These positive risk
premiums are 0.01% for the full sample and 0.01% for both the medium and long maturity
samples, for 1% additional total expenditure/personal income.
In Table (5.3), an increase of tax revenue and intergovernmental revenue is significantly
associated with lower municipal bond yields, but the other revenue has an insignificant
coefficient. Particularly, the coefficient of tax revenue has the highest absolute value among
all the coefficients estimated in the fixed effect regression. A 1% additional tax revenue for
a state lowers its borrowing cost by 0.03%, and a 1% additional intergovernmental revenue
for a state lowers its borrowing cost by 0.01%. Among these three revenue variables, tax
revenue has significant and negative coefficients for the full and all three maturity samples.
Intergovernmental revenue has significant and negative coefficients for the full and only the
medium and long maturity samples. Similarly, current operational and other expenditures
are significantly associated with higher municipal bond yields and the relationships are
stable in the full and all three maturity samples. Capital expenditure is not significant
for the medium maturity sample. Among the three types of expenditure variables, capital
expenditure variable has the highest impact on municipal bond yields. A 1% additional
current, capital, and other expenditure for a state increases its borrowing cost by 0.01%,
0.03%, and 0.02%, respectively. Among the three types of expenditure variables, current
expenditure has significant coefficients for the full and all three maturity samples, but sign
changes from positive to negative for the short maturity sample. Other expenditure has
significant and positive coefficients for the full and only the medium and long maturity
samples. Finally, capital expenditure has significant and positive coefficients for the full
and short and long maturity samples.
In summary, these results suggest that the municipal bond market discounts the revenues
sources and expenditure purposes of state budgets vigilantly, and disciplines or rewards
states based on their fiscal management.
5.2 Model Diagnostic Test
Although this study successfully developed a regression model based on bond character-
istics, fiscal institutions, political institutions, and state economic variables, and fit the data
with a 88% R-square value, it is essential to diagnose the BLUE properties of the estimator
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of the coefficients. One starting point would be to estimate the multicollinearity among
the independent variables, i.e., estimating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Any VIF
value greater than 10 would be an indicator of higher correlation among the independent
variables. From the regression model of equation (5.1), the mean VIF score for all regressors
is calculated to be 4.72. Overall, it can be safely inferred that linear dependence among
regressors in this model is negligible, and the estimators of the coefficients for this regression
model retained the BLUE property.
Three F-tests examine whether all bond character factors, all fiscal institutions, and all
budget variables are blockwise jointly zero. These F-tests show that the coefficients for all
groups are block wise jointly nonzero (p-value less than 1%). Thus, the presence of these
three groups of variables in the regression model is justified, and no risk factors should be
dropped from the regression model, even if any factor is statistically insignificant based on
an individual t-test.
Next, the assumption of normality of the error term could be another property to
examine for the regression model. The assumption that errors of the regression model follow
normal distribution, ∼N(0, σ2In), is essential for the estimators of the coefficients to be the
most efficient estimators among all classes of estimators. A standard Jarque-Bera test for
normality of error term is used for this study to examine the validity of the above-mentioned
assumption. For this regression model, the JB statistic is calculated as 354248. The
chi-square critical value at the 5% level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom is 5.99.
Thus, the null hypothesis of normality is rejected. Since the regression model generated
nonnormal error terms, the estimators of the coefficients for this regression model may
not be the most efficient. Thus, t-statistics calculated for statistical inference should be
accepted with caution.
5.3 Model Validation
Model validation refers to finding the correct model, stability, and robustness of estima-
tors of the regression coefficients as well as the plausibility and usability of the regression
function for prediction and ability to generate inferences drawn from the regression function
(Oredein et al., 2011). Snee (1977) emphasized the model validation by arguing that data
collected without the aid of an experimental design may have several defects. Both the
dependent and independent variables may contain errors, both types of variables may
not have sufficient variations, and important variables may be missing. Thus, some type
of validation should be made before using any model for prediction. There are several
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methods for model validation, e.g., cross validation, bootstrapping, etc. Each validation
model has advantages and disadvantages. Oredein et al. ( 2011) estimated several model
validation techniques for a regression model and found that bootstrapping provides the
minimum prediction errors. Bootstrapping avoids any assumption of the distribution for
a population or for an estimated population parameter. The bootstrap method selects
B number of independent bootstrap samples (X∗1, X∗2, .....X∗b) of size n drawn from the
original sample (F) with replacement: X∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3, ......x∗n); F = (x1, x2, x3, ......xn),
where star sign (*) indicates X∗ is a re-sample version of X. Then it calculates the boot-
strap replication θˆ∗ = (θˆ∗1, θˆ∗2, θˆ∗3, ......θˆ∗b) of the estimator, θˆ = S(x) of the population
parameter (θ). The bootstrap standard error is seB(θˆ) = [1/B
∑B
1 θˆ
∗(b) − θˆ]. Singh
(1981) proved that when n → ∞, the bootstrap distribution of θˆ∗(b) − θˆ also follows the
distribution of θˆ − θ. The bootstrap 100(1-) confidence interval for θˆ can be written as
[tb,α/2 × seb(θˆ) < θˆ < tb,1−α/2 × seb(θˆ)].
Table (5.4) summarizes the bootstrapping results of the regression model in equation
(5.1). Fifty(50) bootstrap samples are generated randomly to estimate the equation (5.1)
regression model, and each sample has 6,000 data points.
The bootstrap statistics show that all of the coefficients estimated from equation (5.1)
are statistically significant except the state tax, revenue limit, the ACIR index, and Other
revenue. Thus, no substantial anomalies are found between classical inference and the
boot-strap inference. Therefore, the bootstrap method validates most of the fixed effect
(LSDV) estimation results without any normality assumption in error terms.
5.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The main findings of this study are that yields on municipal general obligation bonds in
the primary market are responsive to fiscal institutions and the fiscal budget management
of a borrowing state. By charging lower interest rates, the municipal bond primary mar-
ket rewards states that have prudent fiscal budget management and stronger antideficit,
balanced budget rules. This study estimates a municipal general bond pricing model by
analyzing 17,400 general obligations bonds issued in the primary market.
The macroeconomic model shows that spread between the borrowing cost of a state and
the risk-free rate is a function of the default probability (PD) of the state government and
loss given default (LGD) for investors. In this macroeconomic model framework, the prob-
ability of default is determined simultaneously by the intertemporal utility maximization
behaviors of investors (consumers) and the ability of a state government to maintain its
budget constraints. In theory, the factors identified and discussed by the model account
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for the exogenous shocks to a state government′s finance, which influences its default
probability. These risk factor categories could be bond-specific factors, fiscal antideficit
institutions, and fiscal budget management.
General obligation municipal bonds show a substantial variation in bond-specific charac-
teristics, such as maturity, call option, third-party insurance, credit ratings, state taxation,
and offer method (negotiated versus competitive bids), etc. This study finds a statistically
significant risk premium for every bond-specific factor. A bond that has a higher credit
rating, is covered by third-party insurance, and is offered by negotiation instead of compet-
itive bids, is priced higher (offers lower yield) in the primary market. On the other hand,
if the interest income of a bond is subject to state tax and/or it has an option call, it is
priced lower (offers a higher yield) in the primary market. This study also reveals that the
primary market for general obligation bonds is also segmented among short-, medium-, and
long-term maturities. Bonds of short-term (1-5 years) and medium-term maturities (6-12
years) offer on average 1.39% and 1.20% lower yields, respectively, than bonds of long-term
maturities (Table 5.2). These findings also support the arguments of Rosenbloom (1976)
as well as Kidwell and Koch (1983). The results have potential implications for the fiscal
management of a state. In normal economic conditions, unless fiscal authorities expect a
drastic up or down movement of future market interest rates-they could keep borrowing costs
lower by issuing short- or medium-term bonds and foregoing call option right. Attracting
a third-party insurer to insure the debt payment in case of default could also lower the
borrowing cost. One future extension of this research would be to examine the influence of
the expected movements of future interest rates (yield curve) to the risk premium for the
longer maturity and for the presence of call option. The hierarchical linear model could
provide a very useful methodology for this research.
Except for Vermont, each state has a balanced budget requirement, but the stringency
of these requirements varies widely. In addition, many states have legislative and/or
constitutional limits on expenditure, revenue/tax imposition, and debt level. This study
estimates that states that have stronger antideficit rules also have lower borrowing costs
(0.01%). This study also finds that states that have legislative and constitutional limits
on fiscal expenditures borrow with 0.8% lower interest rates in the primary market. These
findings confirm the arguments of Poterba and Rueben (1999). Another interesting result
is that the municipal bond market actually penalizes states that have a debt limit with a
higher borrowing cost (0.02%). Future research might examine whether antideficit fiscal
rules are counterproductive during business downturns, when states cannot increase fiscal
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expenditures to fight recessions. As a result, states′ inability to conduct countercyclical
fiscal policies may prolong the lengths of recessions. The municipal bond market, then,
could price these fiscal institutions negatively during recessions.
Since the default risk of a borrowing state rises with the inability of that state to manage
its primary budget deficit and to service its existing debt, investors in the municipal bond
market need to judge the sources of the budget deficit (i.e., different components of revenue
and expenditure). Yields on municipal bonds should reflect their judgments. This study
reports that the primary market for general obligation bonds prices the revenue and the
expenditure management of a borrowing state. Borrowing states that have higher tax
revenues and receive higher intergovernmental revenues pay lower interest rates. Similarly,
borrowing states that have higher current operational expenditures (larger size of govern-
ments) and higher expenditures for welfare, subsidy, etc., pay higher interest rates in the
primary market. These findings reveal important information about relationships between
fiscal budget management and borrowing cost in the municipal bond market. The municipal
bond market heavily prices tax revenue, which is almost 68% of a state′s income. It demands
0.01% lower borrowing costs for 1% of additional tax revenue. Surprisingly, however, the
municipal bond market also demands 0.03% lower borrowing costs for 1% additional federal
money transferred to states. This intergovernmental revenue consists of 22% of a state′s
fiscal revenue. This finding emphasizes the size and importance of federal money for states.
Finally, Bootstrap model validation techniques validate the statistical significance of
the municipal bond pricing model (equation 5.1) by repeating the fixed effect (LSDV)
estimations on 50 samples, without assuming any normally distributed error terms. The
boot strap techniques substantiate that the estimated parameters from the model are stable,
robust, and significant.
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muniyield(n): yield to maturity per year of a municipal bond with n year maturity
treasyield(n): yield to maturity per year of a treasury bond with n year maturity
issue size: logarithmic value of issue amount of a municipal bond
call option: 1 if there is a call option for a municipal bond
insurance: 1 if i-th municipal bond is insured by a third party
state tax : 1 if there is state tax on interest income of a municipal
negotiation: 1 if a municipal bond is offered by negotiation, not competitive bids
credit rating: credit rating of a municipal bond
short: 1 if maturity of a bond is between 1-5 years
medium 1 if maturity of a bond is between 6-12 years
maturity-short Maturity of a bond if it has a shorter maturity
maturity-
medium
Maturity of a bond if it has a medium maturity
ACIR: Balanced budget rules index value for a state at year t, ranges from 0 to 10
debt limit: 1 if a state has a limit to issue general obligation bonds
expenditure
limit:
1 if a state has a limit for expenditure
revenue limit: 1 if a state has a limit for tax
totalrev: Total revenue/personal income collected by a state
taxrev: Tax revenue/personal income collected by a state
intgovtrev: Intergovernmental revenue /personal income received by a state
otherrev: All other revenues/personal income collected by a state
totalexp: Spending for current operation/personal income by a state
currentexp: Spending for capital outlay/personal income by a state
capitalexp: Other spending/personal income by a state
otherexp: Fiscal surplus or deficit before interest payment /personal income for a
state
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Table 5.2. Fixed Effect (LSDV) Regressions Results for Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions,
and Fiscal Budgets on Municipal Bond Yields.
.










treasyield 0.57 162.01 0.64 139.6 0.52 88.21 0.36 36.66
negotiate -0.13 -15.44 -0.11 -7.42 -0.13 -11.06 -0.08 -5.31
credit rating 0.06 17.03 0.06 7.6 0.05 11.19 -0.01 -1.43
lnissuesize -0.03 -7.17 -0.02 -3.7 -0.04 -7.24 -0.02 -2.76
option 0.11 5.46 0.03 0.72 0.03 1.98 0.24 3.61
statetax -0.01 -0.45 0 0.09 0.02 0.78 -0.12 -4.19
insurance -0.14 -16.63 -0.08 -2.79 -0.08 -6.44 -0.15 -14.36
short -1.3 -43.86 – – – – – –
shortmat -1.12 -22.75 – – – – – –
medium 0.1 20.61 – – – – – –
mediummat 0.08 19.83 – – – – – –
maturity – – 0.08 15.81 0.09 27.35 0.03 25.13
ACIR -0.01 -2.46 -0.01 -0.64 -0.01 -1.73 0.01 1.15
Expendlimit -0.07 -10.79 -0.07 -5.22 -0.04 -4.84 -0.09 -8.98
Revlimit 0.03 2.96 -0.04 -1.91 0.02 1.32 0.06 3.28
Debtlimit 0.02 3.43 0 0.17 0.02 2.45 0.03 2.7
Totalrev -0.01 -2.68 0.01 1.53 -0.01 -0.34 -0.01 -5.01
Totalexp 0.01 4.92 -0.01 -0.52 0.01 2.84 0.01 6.64
intercept 2.11 25.58 0.59 4.87 1.28 10.74 2.36 13.52
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Table 5.3. Fixed Effect (LSDV) Regressions Results for Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions,
and Decomposed Fiscal Budgets on Municipal Bond Yields.
.










treasyield 0.57 157.72 0.63 131.04 0.52 85.35 0.37 36.85
negotiate -0.13 -15.74 -0.11 -7.28 -0.13 -10.9 -0.09 -6.09
credit rating 0.06 16.98 0.06 8.39 0.05 10.99 0.01 -0.62
lnissuesize -0.03 -7.26 -0.02 -3.66 -0.04 -6.98 -0.03 -3.51
option 0.11 5.45 0.03 0.68 0.03 1.89 0.25 3.65
statetax -0.01 -0.26 0.02 0.34 0.04 1.13 -0.11 -4.01
insurance -0.13 -16.06 -0.06 -2.22 -0.07 -5.63 -0.15 -14.35
short -1.3 -43.87 – – – – – –
medium -1.12 -22.84 – – – – – –
shortmat 0.1 20.55 – – – – – –
mediummat 0.08 19.94 – – – – – –
maturity – – 0.08 16.38 0.01 27.65 0.03 25.24
ACIR 0.01 -0.57 0.01 0.51 0.61 0.14 0.01 1.95
expendlimit -0.08 -12.28 -0.07 -5.23 -0.01 -5.48 -0.1 -10.12
revlimit 0.03 2.57 -0.04 -1.83 0.07 0.22 0.07 3.45
debtlimit 0.02 2.37 -0.01 -0.38 0.7 0.66 0.02 2.29
taxrev -0.01 -13.45 -0.01 -2.53 0.01 -9.45 -0.05 -12.4
intgovtrev -0.03 -4.09 -0.01 0.86 -0.39 -5.59 -0.02 -4.58
otherrev 0.01 1.26 0.01 1.98 0.05 4.53 -0.01 -2.53
currentexp 0.01 5.15 -0.01 -3.31 0.01 4.71 0.02 8.14
capitalexp 0.03 3.26 0.06 3.08 0.01 0.12 0.05 4.29
otherexp 0.02 10.13 0.02 4.78 0.01 8.82 0.02 5.94
intercept 2.1 25.03 0.5 4.11 1.25 10.47 2.48 13.68
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Table 5.4. Bootstrapping for Bond Factors, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Budgets on
Municipal Bond Yields.
.








treasyield 0.57 0.004 157.72 0.007 86.71
negotiate -0.13 0.008 -15.74 0.013 -9.69
credit rating 0.06 0.004 16.98 0.007 8.33
lnissuesize -0.03 0.004 -7.26 0.006 -4.32
option 0.11 0.02 5.45 0.037 3
statetax -0.01 0.021 -0.26 0.03 -0.18
insurance -0.13 0.008 -16.06 0.015 -9.04
short -1.3 0.03 -43.87 0.052 -24.97
medium -1.12 0.049 -22.84 0.084 -13.33
shortmat 0.1 0.005 20.55 0.009 11.16
mediummat 0.08 0.004 19.94 0.006 12.11
ACIR 0.007 0.001 -0.57 0.002 -0.43
expendlimit -0.08 0.006 -12.28 0.011 -7.13
revlimit 0.03 0.011 2.57 0.018 1.6
debtlimit 0.02 0.007 2.37 0.012 1.36
intgovtrev -0.03 0.002 -13.45 0.004 -7.11
Tax rev -0.01 0.002 -4.09 0.004 -2.27
otherrev 0.002 0.001 1.26 0.002 0.93
currentexp 0.01 0.002 5.15 0.002 3.85
capitalexp 0.03 0.008 3.26 0.013 2.08
otherexp 0.02 0.002 10.13 0.004 5.58
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